

Municipal Neoliberalism and the Ontario State

CARLO FANELLI

This chapter is concerned with the municipal policy of the Ontario provincial state. A key aspect of this chapter is to consider how federal and provincial relations and public policies with respect to municipalities have been restructured over the postwar period. Neoliberal policy prescriptions rose to prominence in the 1980s, slowly displacing the politics of postwar Keynesianism. These market-reinforcing practices reconfigured public spending, social welfare initiatives, and the relationship between the state, capital, and labour. Since the onset of the 2008 recession and subsequent turn to “permanent austerity” (Albo and Fanelli 2014), the local state has come under new pressures to privatize social services and reduce the costs of public administration, often through seeking wage and benefit concessions from unionized municipal workers. The restructuring of Ontario municipalities can be understood as an extension of federal and provincial neoliberal restructuring, although in a variegated and non-linear manner (Fanelli 2016). The response of labour and social justice activists at the local level to such attacks will have important public policy implications for generations to come.

NEOLIBERALISM AND LOCAL STATES

As David Harvey has argued: “From their inception, cities have arisen through geographical and social concentrations of a surplus product. Urbanization has always been, therefore, a class phenomenon, since surpluses are extracted from somewhere and from somebody, while

the control over their disbursement typically lies in a few hands" (2009, 315–16). As such, the problems of capitalist urbanization extend beyond public administration and the management of urban-suburban development as these are rooted in the concrete forms of state power and public policies through which market rule is established. In both practice and political ideology, neoliberalism is many sided, including a broad set of macroeconomic policies, a worldview, and an approach to public policy. Emerging in the economic downturn of the 1970s, neoliberal policies focused on wide-ranging transformations in economic policy, democratic structures, and the organization of work, which deepened inequalities of class, race, and gender as equity policies fell to the wayside (Brenner and Theodore 2002). At the core of neoliberalism has been an effort to reconstitute capitalist class power through re-establishing the political conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation. In this regard, the state (at various levels of public administration) has imposed austerity from above or led the charge from below, while at other times creating the conditions for capital to lead an assault against labour and social services that had been in part shielded from commodification (Albo et al. 1993; Panitch and Swartz 2003; McBride 2017).

Proponents of neoliberalism maintained that states ought to be limited to securing the institutional preconditions for a competitive market, and, once established, remolding state practices in order to ensure market rule. Understood this way, states are to be limited to the protection of private property, security, national defense, and the legal enforcement of contracts so as to embed market dependence. As a social paradigm and policy framework, neoliberalism abandons full employment and national economic development, and shifts from collective to individual responsibility (Workman 2009). This includes the limiting of wage increases to below increases in productivity, the systemic use of state power to impose market-imperatives and create new spaces for accumulation, inflation-targeting by the central bank, regressive tax reforms, the erosion and dismantlement of social services, and the encouragement of foreign direct investment and trade liberalization (Burke et al. 2000; Braedley and Luxton 2010).

The restructuring of regulatory frameworks and governance arrangements between levels of government have reshaped institutional

landscapes and rewoven the interconnections among them (Peck 2013). The subsequent tendency has been to limit the scope for the exercise of national discretion through socio-spatial reconfigurations along market lines. This has entailed the introduction of new state supports and mechanisms that facilitate private accumulation, as well as the retrenchment of social programs provided by the state. Thus restructuring has entailed the simultaneous devolution and upwards transference of regulatory responsibilities to other tiers of government, often without matching fiscal supports or decision-making powers. This fluid process of politico-institutional realignment prevents any one scale of government from using their regulatory authority to erect trade barriers against the goods and services from other political units, thereby entrenching capital mobility and avoiding any centralization or harmonization of market-inhibiting policies (Harmes 2005). This process can be understood as the locking-in of inter-jurisdictional competition, with the aim of commodifying all spheres of social life.

Municipalities have become critical nodal points as territorial-institutional arrangements evolve in locally specific capitalist contexts. New fiscal constraints upon municipalities from national and provincial spending cuts, for example, have intensified competitive pressures and demands for austerity. Even though the fiscal capacity of municipalities to generate revenue is weak, they are often left to provide services formerly provided by other tiers of government, such as social assistance, transit, infrastructure, and environmental protection.

In this regard, local public policy increasingly promotes conditions amenable to capital accumulation, regardless of the social costs. These policies include cost-cutting measures aimed at “administrative efficiencies,” reductions to public services, state subsidies to private capital, and attacks on public sector unions (Evans and Fanelli 2018). Local states create new spaces for competition, privatization, and interlocal and regional entrepreneurialism (Leitner and Sheppard 1998). Altogether, then, municipal neoliberalism can be understood as: an uneven process of political and economic restructuring of institutional relationships across the multiple scales of governance; a policy regime promoting local processes of marketization, fiscal austerity, and flexibilization of work relations; and a process of internationalizing the local economy.

REMAKING MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE IN ONTARIO, 1970-1994

According to Section 92(8) of the Canadian Constitution, the provinces may exclusively make laws governing municipal institutions. Understood this way, municipalities are essentially “creatures” of provincial governments that can create, modify, or eliminate a local government, as well as determine its powers and responsibilities. Ontario has one of the most decentralized municipal structures in Canada (Sancton and Young 2009). In Ontario, municipalities consist of cities, towns, villages, and townships. Above them are regional governance structures composed of regions, counties and districts, and upper-tier municipalities, on whose council sit members of lower-tier units located within its boundaries. Some cities and towns, for example Toronto and Barrie, are single-tier municipalities and exercise the full responsibilities for municipal government that are elsewhere split between tiers. Upper-tier municipalities are headed by a chair or warden, while lower-tier municipalities are headed by a mayor or reeve. As table 8.1 shows, as of 2013 Ontario has 444 municipalities of varying structures.

Despite a variety of governance arrangements, the inability of municipalities to meet their fiscal requirements has been a chronic feature of Canadian urbanism for at least the last three decades, as revenue capacities could not keep up with growing expenditure needs. Provincial and federal governments sought to “solve” their own budgetary impasses by shifting the costs of social and physical infrastructure downward to lower tiers of government (McBride and Shields 1997). Although the federal government has no constitutionally prescribed municipal powers, nearly all of its decisions affect municipalities in one way or another. However, except for some grants, bilateral agreements, and emergency relief, the federal role in municipal affairs over the last three decades has largely revolved around ad hoc agreements (Stoney and Graham 2009). Thus, there is a complete absence in Canada of a national policy for cities or for urban funding of crucial infrastructure, transportation, housing, immigration, and poverty-related issues.

From 1971-79, the federal government’s Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) attempted to institutionalize federal-municipal relations (Spicer 2011). However, as “cooperative federalism” gave way to “contested federalism” in the 1980s, the federal government scrapped

Table 8.1 | Municipal structure in Ontario as of 2013

Type of tier	Number of municipalities
SINGLE TIERS	
Southern Ontario	29
Northern Ontario	144
<i>Total single tiers</i>	173
LOWER TIERS	
Within a region	43
Within a county	198
<i>Total lower tiers</i>	241
UPPER TIERS	
Region	8
County	22
<i>Total upper tiers</i>	30
TOTAL NUMBER OF MUNICIPALITIES	444

Source: Slack and Bird (2013).

the ministry and abandoned any semblance of sustained urban policy. As neoliberalism gained ideological and political momentum, make-shift local agreements became entrenched as policy practice (Laycock 2002; Carroll and Ratner 2005).

Unlike the federal and provincial scales of administration, municipalities do not have the power to implement a broad range of tax measures such as income, corporate, sales, resource, and import taxes. Municipalities are also limited in their ability to incur debt.¹ As table 8.2 shows, Ontario municipalities overwhelmingly rely on property taxes to raise revenue outside of federal and provincial transfers. From this, as table 8.3 illustrates, they must provide for general government administration, social assistance and health services, social housing, fire and policing, and so forth. In reality these figures underestimate municipalities' overreliance on property-related taxes, since Toronto is also able to draw on revenue streams not available to other cities. As a result of dwindling transfers to municipalities, the 1990s saw renewed calls for greater federal involvement in municipal affairs, in particular related to revenue transfers. This resulted in the establishment of the Canada Infrastructure Works Program in 1993, which provided

Table 8.2 | City of Toronto operating revenue, 2017

<i>Revenue sources</i>	<i>\$millions</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Property tax	4,046	33
Province	2,071	17
Rate programs	1,786	14
Toronto Transit Commission fares	1,246	10
Reserves, transfers from capital, investment income	826	7
User fees and fines	793	6
Land transfer tax	716	6
Other	793	6
Federal	147	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$12.33 (billion)</i>	<i>100%</i>

Source: Toronto, 2017 City Budget.

Table 8.3 | City of Toronto operating expenditures, 2017

<i>Main expenditure areas</i>	<i>\$millions</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Social programs	2,899	24
Other city services	2,255	18
Transit	1,955	16
Rate programs	1,786	15
Emergency services	1,781	14
Corporate and capital financing	841	7
Governance and internal services	414	3
Transportation	399	3
<i>Total</i>	<i>\$12.33 (Billion)</i>	<i>100%</i>

Source: Toronto, 2017 City Budget.

\$2.5 billion over five years for local services and infrastructure. Unlike the MSUA, though, the federal government's role would be limited to providing one-time fiscal injections rather than long-term, predictable, and stable intergovernmental planning and funding arrangements.

Although Ontario has long been a province dominated by Conservative rule, by the mid-1980s Ontario had been transformed into an urbanized manufacturing and service economy in the South, and a service and extraction-based economy centered on the mineral and forest sectors in the North (MacDermid and Albo 2001). While real growth

in Ontario exceeded 4 per cent per year from 1984–89 (the largest and most sustained since the 1960s), federal cuts to shared-cost arrangements made themselves felt on Ontario's fiscal position. By the late 1980s the David Peterson-led Liberals were making the case that federal downloading had resulted in over \$1 billion in lost revenue (Government of Ontario Ministry of Treasury and Economics 1988). In an attempt to partially offset eroding revenues, the Liberals raised a broad range of consumption taxes on gasoline, tobacco, alcohol, and general retail sales. However, as the federal government reduced corporate and personal income taxes in the late 1980s as it began to "individualize" the welfare state, the Ontario Liberals followed suit by lowering capital taxes and reducing from ten to three the number of personal income tax brackets. This set in motion what was to become a staple of neoliberal policymaking: the erosion of public revenue through tax cuts and the downloading of service delivery to lower levels of government with even more limited fiscal capacities.

After a surprise election victory in September 1990, the Bob Rae-led NDP government continued along the course of minor increases to income security programs set by the Peterson Liberals in its first budget. This included a 7 per cent increase to basic social assistance rates and 10 per cent to shelter rates, including the uploading of single parents from municipalities and raising lone parents to the same income standard (Stapleton 2008). The NDP retreated, however, from the more ambitious increases in corporate and wealth taxes, as well as from public auto insurance, succumbing to the neoliberal orthodoxy of balanced budgets (Azoulay 2000; Walkom 1994). The evolving policy approach of the NDP, as it began to pursue governance within the constraints of neoliberalism, also meant taking distance from the report, produced under the chair of former Toronto mayor John Sewell, on the reform of the municipal planning and development system in Ontario. The Sewell Report suggested planning legislation that would place checks on urban sprawl and, at same time, densify urban development. The plan was met with a torrent of backlash from the development industry citing excessive environmental and land use regulation. The retreat from the Sewell Report ended any further attempts by the NDP at reforming provincial-municipal relations, leaving in place the ad hoc negotiations and regulations that had defined Ontario planning under

the Conservatives (Desfor and Keil 2004; Walker 1994). The Fair Tax Commission suffered a similar fate. It recommended moving away from property taxes, and instead, increasing and making more progressive the provincial personal income tax.² All talk of municipal tax reform ended with the election of the Mike Harris Conservatives in 1995 and the hard-right pursuit of neoliberal policies began in earnest.

PUBLIC SERVICES AND MUNICIPAL TRANSFERS, 1995-2005

The 1995 federal budget terminated the Canada Assistance Plan and Established Programs Financing, replacing them with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) (McBride and Shields 1997). The CHST represented a significant reduction to provincial transfers in the realm of social assistance, post-secondary education, and health care funding. The new block funding removed the previous 50/50 cost-sharing arrangement and replaced it with a combination of cash and tax points transfers that were frozen at 1995 levels for the next five years, significantly eroding the real levels of provision due to inflation and population growth. This unilateral devolution of social welfare responsibility not only cut federal funding, it also led to an erosion of national enforcement standards and a reduction in the quality and scope of public services.

Alongside the cuts to transfers, the federal Liberals launched a series of uncoordinated programs targeted at urban issues. One was the 1998 Urban Aboriginal Strategy, which over three years provided \$25 million to cities in order to build organizational capacities within urban Aboriginal communities and develop partnerships with provincial and municipal governments. The fund also sought to coordinate federal government resources with provincial and municipal departments in order to address the disparity between urban Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal groups (AANDC 2005). A year later, the federal government launched the National Homelessness Initiative as a way of channeling funds to municipalities in order to deal with poverty across the provinces and territories. In 2000, the federal Liberals put forward the Infrastructure Canada Program that, over the next decade, distributed \$2 billion for local infrastructure projects, as well as the Green Municipal Fund that was to be managed by the Federation of

Canadian Municipalities and provided \$125 million for local environmental initiatives. In 2001, the Green Municipal Fund was doubled and an additional \$680 million was allocated to cities under the Affordable Housing Program. Another \$2 billion was directed to municipalities in the form of the Canadian Strategic Infrastructure Fund, along with \$600 million for the Border Infrastructure Fund.

A year later, the federal government combined various infrastructure and grant programs under Infrastructure Canada and included a national effort to fund a New Deal for Cities and Communities (Bradford 2007). The intention was to address both municipal fiscal pressures, particularly those related to infrastructure, and public policy concerns. The 2004 and 2005 budgets included a full goods and services tax rebate worth some \$7 billion over ten years, an allocation on a per capita basis of 5 cents per litre of the federal gas tax worth approximately \$9 billion over five years, and \$800 million for public transit distributed on the basis of transit ridership (in part to meet the needs of the large cities). In addition to new municipal revenue transfers, new intergovernmental consultative bodies were created that brought together urban development experts and community groups. Despite an influx of new federal funding and involvement, these measures were not enough to offset some three decades of combined neglect and downloading from federal and provincial governments (FCM 2012).

Parallel to the CHST cuts, the newly elected Conservative government of Mike Harris decisively turned to “slash and burn” neoliberalism with the release of its *Ontario Fiscal Overview and Spending Cuts and Fiscal and Economic Statement* (Reshef and Rastin 2003; Kozolanka 2007). Among the first pieces of legislation rescinded by the Harris government was the *Planning Reform Act*, which sought to curb urban sprawl by linking municipal requirements to provincial planning applications, zoning bylaws, and planning related documents. The catalogue of other measures undertaken by the Harris government negatively impacting the fiscal capacity and service provision of municipalities is lengthy. This includes a moratorium on the development of non-profit housing and cooperatives; suspension of \$234 million worth of spending on public transportation, road, and highway maintenance; elimination of recycling funds and environmental grants to municipalities totaling \$24 million; \$290 million in funding cuts to the

Ontario Municipal Support Program; over \$12 million in cuts to public libraries; cancellation of the conversion of private sector child care spaces into non-profit spaces; and a reduction in transfers to school boards by \$400 million (Government of Ontario 1995a, 1995b). In the 1999 Speech from the Throne, the Conservatives boasted of making over ninety-nine different forms of tax cuts (Government of Ontario 1999), cuts that significantly eroded provincial revenues and increased the fiscal burden on municipalities.

The Conservatives also instituted a series of controversial municipal amalgamations. When Harris came into office there were 815 municipalities in Ontario. But the *Fewer Municipal Politicians Act* (1996) reduced that number to 447 by 2001, cutting the number of municipal councillors from 4,586 to 2,804 and school board trustees from 1,900 to 700 (Sancton 2000; Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009). The largest and most extensive amalgamation occurred under the provisions of the *City of Toronto Act* (1997), where six cities and seven governments were merged to create the single-tier City of Toronto (Boudreau 2000). This restructuring of Ontario municipalities involved a massive devolution of program spending and responsibilities onto municipalities: social services, public school services, non-profit housing, roads, public infrastructure, long-term health care, child care, shelters, children's aid societies, ambulance, fire and police services, waste collection, and public health and transportation – all became increasingly or wholly reliant on the municipal tax base. Following the federal government strategy, the downloading of responsibilities by the Harris government onto municipalities occurred without an equivalent transfer of funding or new fiscal powers. Amalgamation was overwhelmingly rejected by urban social movements, trade unionists, and the general public across Ontario municipalities (Sancton 1996; Kushner and Siegal 2003). But this did little to deter the Conservatives from amalgamating communities. The Conservatives argued that amalgamation was in the interest of all Ontarians as it would lower costs, remove barriers to investment, enable private sector job creation, and increase the political coherence and economic efficiency of municipalities.

Invoking a report by the accounting firm KPMG (1996), the Conservatives contended that through amalgamation Toronto could realize upwards of \$865 million in savings over the first three years. But

this was later contradicted by a report from Deloitte and Touche (1997) that criticized KPMG's flawed report and showed that savings would be next to nothing. One year into amalgamation, the city found itself short of \$164 million in tax revenues as a result of downloading, making a mockery of Harris's projected cost-savings and his freeze on commercial property taxes. In turn, Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman's promise to freeze residential property taxes for a decade was shredded.

The municipalities of Ottawa, Hamilton, Sudbury, Kingston, and Chatham-Kent, respectively, were also amalgamated as part of the Municipal Act, 2001, which consolidated dozens of municipal statutes and entrenched neoliberal administrative reforms. In what was to become a recurring saga, rather than address the structural deficit of Ontario municipalities and especially larger cities, the provincial government proceeded to provide one-time fiscal injections and short-term loans. As a result of the structural shortfall due to downloading and tax cuts, Ontario municipalities responded by seeking wage and benefit concessions from workers, contracting-out, privatization and raising user fees. By the end of the Conservatives' second term, more than \$650 million had been cut from municipal transfers.

The movement away from shared-cost provincial-municipal funding shifted the burden of revenues coming from the progressive general income and corporate taxes applied at the provincial level to the narrower base of municipal property taxes. Amalgamation of cities did little to reduce the costs of public administration; rather, it led to wide-ranging cuts to public services, diminished service levels, labour strife, and recurring budgetary shortfalls (Sancton 2000; Boudreau 2009; Albo and Fanelli 2018). The Conservative tenure at Queen's Park from 1995 to 2003 radically extended neoliberal policies. For municipalities, territorial boundaries were remade and responsibilities for delivering services increased despite the absence of an equivalent transfer of administrative powers to raise revenues.

CONSOLIDATING MUNICIPAL NEOLIBERALISM

After thirteen years of Liberal government in Ottawa, the Conservatives formed a minority government in 2006. The Harper-led Conservatives shifted the urban policy landscape away from some of the

programs initiated by the Martin Liberals supporting municipalities. Instead, the Conservatives' circumscribed role for urban policy focused on piecemeal injections of funds into urban policy issues. The two most important initiatives were the Building Canada Infrastructure Plan and the Gas Tax Fund (GTF). The former provided \$40 billion for municipal infrastructure over 2007–14, but covered less than 2 per cent of outstanding national needs (Warren 2013). The GTF provided Canadian municipalities with \$2 billion annually, and since 2013 has been indexed to inflation.

Additionally, the 2009 federal budget provided some \$12 billion in new infrastructure spending. But many municipal projects missed a federal government-mandated completion deadline in 2012, with Infrastructure Canada remaining “tight-lipped on the amount of money municipalities left on the table” (Tapper 2012). The Conservatives also provided an additional \$1.25 billion in funding to support provincial, territorial, and municipal budgets, but made this funding contingent on public-private partnerships. Between 1989 and 2009, federal expenditures per capita in constant dollars fell at an average annual rate of 0.3 per cent as the retrenchment of local support continued. By 2014, general federal transfers to municipalities represented only 1.6 per cent of total municipal revenues. Over the course of nearly a decade in power, the federal Conservatives had cut some \$220 billion in revenue generation in the form of corporate and income taxes as well as the reduction of the goods and services tax from 7 to 6 and later 5 per cent (Whittington 2011). The revenue foregone might have been used to repair the decimated state of municipal financing in Canada, or restoring any number of social programs.

Rather than depart from this market-led revamping of the public sector, the Dalton McGuinty Liberals further consolidated the neo-liberal policy regime, with a few modest, and indeed unavoidable, amendments in the area of urban policy (Fanelli and Thomas 2011). The Liberal government, for example, extended some revenue-generating capacities to the city of Toronto with the passing of the *City of Toronto Act* (2006), and later, to a lesser extent, to other municipalities with the passing of the *Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act* (2006). The acts granted new powers to municipalities to enter into agreements with other governments, pass bylaws and levy some taxes. New powers

assigned to municipalities also granted more control over the demolition of rental properties, green energy requirements, city-building standards such as height and density requirements, and faster approval of community improvement plans and brownfield remediation. While the acts expanded some powers, they stopped short of extending additional recognition of operational autonomy and capacities to municipalities in the absence of provincial oversight (for example, taxing powers related to income, wealth, or general sales). The City of Toronto's Municipal Land Transfer Tax and (now defunct) Personal Vehicle Ownership Tax served as exceptions, as a result of specific powers conferred onto the city by the province in the 2006 act allowing for more, if minor, flexible forms of revenue generation (Fanelli 2016).

In 2006, the Liberals launched the Provincial-Municipal Fiscal and Service Delivery Review (Government of Ontario Ministry of Finance 2008). Reporting in 2008, the review proposed that the province take over some (but not all) of the services and responsibilities downloaded onto municipalities during the Harris era. Beginning in 2010 and staggered over the next eight years, the province agreed to upload some of the costs associated with provincial court services, prisoner transport, public transit, and portions of the Ontario Disability Support Plan, Ontario Drug Benefit Plan, and Ontario Works. While the new arrangement provided some much-needed uploading of administrative costs and revenue transfers, it did little to address crumbling social services and housing, urban incapacities to address climate change, inadequate funding for public transit, housing, and restoring infrastructure support to pre-Harris era levels.

Between 1981 and 2017 Ontario's population grew from 8.3 million to about 14.5 million. Nearly 70 per cent live in the Greater Toronto Area, Canada's largest continuous urban area. The GTA is also the fastest growing region in Ontario, with major employment in manufacturing, financial services, agriculture, and food processing (Ali, 2008; Macdonald and Keil 2012; Donald 2005). It is worth noting that Ontario has more than one-half of the first-class agricultural land in Canada, and produces one-quarter of the country's total farm revenues. Because 90 per cent of Canadians live in a narrow band along the US border, the erosion of prime agricultural land as a result of urban sprawl, particularly in Ontario, is a significant public policy concern.³ Lacking

alternative means by which to raise revenue, many municipalities have come to rely on unchecked urban growth as a way to expand their property tax base and increase revenues.

Sara Macdonald and Roger Keil (2012) note that for decades the region has been locked into a low-density, automobile-dependent suburban growth dynamic. As a result of the uneven dispersal of population and employment between 1986 and 2001, the province saw a 53 per cent increase in the supply of new roads and 38 per cent growth in new highways. But, at the same time, transit ridership declined over the last two decades in all regions across the GTA except for Peel (Pond 2009). Ontario residents are among the most automobile dependent in the country. In 2006, 71 per cent of workers in the Toronto census metropolitan area got to work by car, while only 22 per cent used public transit. Likewise, more than 80 per cent of all workers across other census metropolitan areas covered under the *Places to Grow* legislation drove to work, and less than 10 per cent took public transit. It has been estimated that congestion costs the GTA area more than \$6 billion annually as automobile-dependent urban sprawl increases air pollution, congestion along trade corridors, and greenhouse gases, resulting in Ontario having the highest ground-level ozone concentrations in the country (Ali 2008; Metrolinx 2008). Expensive low-density infrastructure puts upward pressure on tax rates, raising residential and commercial costs and impeding the flow of goods and services. If left unchecked, urban sprawl over the next 30 years could absorb more than 1,000 square kilometres of land to meet projected population influxes of more than 3 million. As a result of Ontario municipalities' administrative incapacity and unwillingness to check urban sprawl – including concerns about congestion and environmental degradation – the Ontario government launched the *Greenbelt Act* in 2005.

The *Greenbelt* legislation covers 7,300 square kilometres of southern Ontario, stretching around the Toronto region from Rice Lake in Northumberland County in the east to the Niagara River in the southwest. The *Greenbelt* plan prohibits development outside existing municipal boundaries in designated areas close to environmentally sensitive lands, and mandates higher residential and employment densities, mixed-use communities, and infill development (Ali 2008). Under the *Greenbelt* plan, and its companion *Places to Grow* (2005)

legislation, decisions about farmland and urban development have been removed from hundreds of municipal councils around the region and placed into the hands of Queen Park (Pond 2009). The Places to Grow legislation identifies sixteen major growth areas in mid-sized cities in southern Ontario based on their capacity to accommodate population and employment growth and to provide vital linkages to transit systems in urban growth centres. The growth plan states that a minimum of 40 per cent of all annual residential development must be built within urban areas and not on greenfield sites (Government of Ontario 2012).

The Greenbelt legislation establishes planning and land-use restrictions, whereas the Places to Grow legislation sets a density target of fifty or more residents and jobs combined per hectare. The legislation requires that municipalities identify areas for density expansion in official municipal plans. The purpose of the Greenbelt legislation is to contain urban growth, preserve farmland and agrarian economies, and create compact development. The acts also aim to prevent land speculation and reduce growth pressures along sensitive ecological and hydrological lands which include the Niagara Escarpment and the Oak Ridges Moraine. Thus the Greenbelt plan is about where growth is prohibited, while Places to Grow sets out where and how this growth should happen.⁴ In easing congestion, increasing the use of public transportation, and raising density requirements for residential and commercial developers, the acts also endeavour to increase the economic development of the region as a whole.

Some sectors of the development industry have predictably argued that anti-sprawl legislation is an illegitimate intervention by the provincial government into municipal affairs and that it interferes with market-based residential and commercial outcomes by placing unnecessary restraints on development (Macdonald and Keil 2012). But environmental and community groups have argued that the legislation does not go far enough and that prescribed urban densities should be even higher. They make the case that even with the Greenbelt plan, some 425 square kilometres of rural agricultural land in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton area will be lost by 2031 (SUDA 2011). Moreover, communities located outside of the Greenbelt are not subject to planning coordination and restrictions. This leaves a wide-open game for

developers, with the province doing little to control competition over business incentives and inter-local erosion of tax bases from the surrounding regions. In 2017, the province announced plans to completely overhaul the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), significantly limiting its power over land-use planning for the first time in more than a century. This is, in part, a response to a growing body of research suggesting that land speculation and development has leapfrogged the Greenbelt to the North, while prices south of the belt have risen as much of the land is owned by a small number of developers keen to take advantage of land supply constraints and rulings by the OMB that have tended to favour developers over city planners, local council decisions, and community opposition (Sanberg, Wekerele, and Gilbert 2013). In April 2017, the Local Planning Appeals Tribunal took over the responsibilities of the OMB, making good on a decade-old promise to cities to let them plan their own futures, in addition to helping citizens who have said they are “woefully unprepared” to participate on equal ground against developer interests (Pagliaro 2018).

THE GREAT RECESSION AND BEYOND

In the aftermath of the 2008 recession, the Ontario Liberal government called for a decade of austerity. The major policy planks, in the form of the Open Ontario Plan and the Open for Business Act (2010), called for tax relief, a wage freeze for public sector workers, the privatization of public assets, trade investment, capital liberalization, and regressive reforms to employment standards legislation. These initiatives placed new pressures on municipalities to extract concessions from workers and reduce social services. Between 2010 and 2017, the Liberals attempted to limit annual expenditures to nominal growth of 2 per cent per annum which, given inflation and population increases, continues restraint through a decline in real per capita program spending by the government (the hallmark of how Liberal governments in Ontario have delivered austerity). Consecutive budgets deferred more than \$2 billion in infrastructure spending while cutting corporate and personal income taxes by more than \$4.6 billion as well as an additional \$1.6 billion through the elimination of the Ontario Capital Tax. The measures were on top of a host of other tax cuts, corporate subsidies, and general erosion of revenue capacities (Evans and Fanelli 2018).

The ongoing tax cuts by federal and provincial governments are a core reason for the dilapidated state of much of the social and physical infrastructure of Ontario municipalities.⁵ Whereas municipalities were responsible for some 36 per cent of infrastructure in 1961, this rose to nearly 60 per cent by 2017. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) has estimated that Ontario's infrastructure deficit sits close to \$60 billion: \$28 billion for roads and bridges, \$12.6 billion for water and wastewater, \$10.7 billion for transit, \$6.8 billion for stormwater, and \$1 billion for solid waste (AMO 2012, 2015). In order to partly address this shortfall, in 2015 the Liberal government of Kathleen Wynne proceeded with the controversial decision to privatize a majority stake of Hydro One. As of December 2017, the province had raised an estimated \$9.2 billion by selling off 53 per cent of its stake in the company, with the Liberals planning to use \$5 billion to pay down leftover debt and put the remaining \$4 billion toward funding transit and infrastructure projects. But this does little to address the significant infrastructure deficit currently confronting municipalities across Ontario. In fact, a 2018 report by the Financial Accountability Office of Ontario noted that financing infrastructure projects through traditional debt would have saved the government \$1.8 billion had it not privatized part of Hydro One to raise the money (FAO 2018).

Rapid and uncontrolled GTA development has also increased infrastructure costs, and these expenditures are increasingly financed by municipal debt to cover the capital costs. For example, in York Region, Ontario's fastest-growing municipality, per capita debt has grown from \$319 in 2000 to \$1,192 by 2017 (York Region 2017, 6). Yet, much-needed maintenance and repair in urban areas is often being deferred in favour of expansion to exurban communities on the fringes (CMCC 1999; RCCAO 2010).⁶ The infrastructure deficit excludes parks and recreation, cultural centres, libraries, and heritage facilities, all of which face added pressures for commercialization and privatization amidst declining municipal revenues. In addition, social housing has an estimated replacement cost of \$40 billion, while an additional \$50 billion is needed to expand public transit in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area over the next twenty-five years (AMO 2012; Metrolinx 2008).

Other levels of government have partly recognized the urban fiscal impasse but have done very little to address it in a fundamental way. Pressures for Ontario municipalities to find cost savings and new rev-

venue sources have been growing. This has resulted in the implementation of a broad range of consumption-based taxes and user fees, as well as increases in property taxes just to keep up with existing service shortfalls. There has also been a shift away from commercial property taxes, and below market value development charges, including shared provincial and municipal grants and financial assistance for large corporations to attract private capital (Moussaoui 2013a, 2013b; Skaburskis and Tomalty 1997; Sheppard 2008; Moore 2013). The privatization and contracting-out of municipal assets, services, and employment has been put forward as a means to restore budgets. But the evidence from outsourcing and privatization across Canadian municipalities suggests that the privatization of formerly public sector jobs – and the experiences of private sector building projects on urban transport and infrastructure projects – has correlated with more expensive and lower quality services and reduced public oversight (Whiteside 2017). There are now any number of cases – the most notable being the Walkerton water crisis – to suggest that the outsourcing and consequent deregulation of public services jeopardizes the health and safety of communities as cost-cutting and profit maximization are prioritized (Loxley 2010; Vining and Boardman 2008; Sanger 2011).

In any case, one-time fiscal injections from privatizations do not solve the underlying fiscal constraints of Ontario municipalities – receiving only 9 cents of every tax dollar collected in the province is clearly inadequate to the services and infrastructure provided. The inability of Ontario municipalities to meet revenue needs stems, in part, from governance constraints imposed from above. But the precedence in neoliberal policies given to tax cutting has also directly eroded fiscal capacities. As a consequence, all governments in Canada currently lack the fiscal capacity (and political willingness) to address the municipal infrastructure crisis.

The Doug Ford-led majority Conservative provincial government elected in June 2018 will likely continue to erode public revenue through tax cuts, with particularly damaging consequences for municipalities. Ford campaigned on a pledge to reduce provincial gas tax revenues from 14.7 cents per litre to 9.7 cents per litre (a 34 per cent cut in that revenue source), a loss of approximately \$1 billion in annual provincial revenue. Since the bulk of revenues raised via the gas tax

are allocated to transit and infrastructure spending, it is unclear how the province will make up for this, as the promise to find \$6 billion in “efficiencies” in the public sector without cuts is difficult to envision. Moreover, the Ford platform also calls for reductions to income taxes and carbon taxes. In his 2016 book, *Ford Nation: Two Brothers, One Vision*, Ford noted: “If I ever get to the provincial level of politics, municipal affairs is the first thing I would want to change. I think mayors across the province deserve stronger powers. One person in charge, with veto power, similar to the strong mayoral systems in New York and Chicago and L.A.” (quoted in Rider 2018). Such measures would concentrate decision-making in the hands of the mayor, and limit the role of municipal residents and councillors.

TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE MUNICIPAL AGENDA IN ONTARIO

Breaking the cycle of austerity and retrenchment of municipal neoliberalism in Ontario will require alternative funding arrangements. These will necessarily be premised on an alternative political vision that challenges the continued reliance on tax cuts to spur private sector-led economic growth. A first initiative might be to simply raise revenues in light of decades of federal and provincial off-loading of services and responsibilities. Orthodox policy options have focused on increasing the scope of market imperatives through a continued ideological and political assault on public services and public sector workers (CFIB 2013; University of Toronto Mowat Centre-KPMG 2009). Business and development groups continue to press these solutions on municipal councils through lobbying, local business associations, and bankrolling local campaigns for office.

The current overreliance of Ontario municipalities on property taxes is unsustainable. It has been shifting the burden of responsibility for infrastructure from capital to labour, and from one generation to the next. While municipal development charges are an important revenue source, they tend to be cyclical and rely on the unstable fluctuations of real estate markets. It is necessary, therefore, to establish dedicated funding for municipalities by other levels of government. This could come, to note the most obvious examples, from the reversal of corporate and personal income tax cuts, particularly for ‘one-percenters’,

made since the onset of the 2008 recession, and the return of the GST to 6 or 7 per cent with the increase dedicated to funding municipalities. These changes could provide consistent and secure funding that could begin to redress decades of underinvestment and neglect across Canadian municipalities. Making wealthy individuals and corporations that benefitted the most from neoliberal tax reforms pay higher taxes is important in itself. But broader anti-tax sentiments must also be challenged so that more goods and services come through public and not private consumption.

A progressive municipal agenda also needs to consider a broader range of options for mobilizing revenues, especially if user fees are to be cut and eliminated for many services. The heavy reliance on property taxes as the major source of revenue is rare. Ontario municipalities receive over 60 per cent of their own-source revenues from property-related taxation, whereas the OECD average is 36 per cent. The Nordic countries, Germany and Switzerland, for example, receive over 90 per cent of their tax revenue from income taxes, while Hungary and the Netherlands collect between 50 and 75 per cent of local revenue from various sales taxes. The same is true in France, Japan, Korea, and the US, where sales taxes compose about 20 per cent of local revenue. As the Federation of Canadian Municipalities has argued, there is no natural law dictating that local governments be exclusively dependent on the property tax; a multiplicity of revenue streams is needed to ensure diverse, predictable and long-term funding for municipalities (FCM 2012, 15).

Extensive research has demonstrated the social and economic benefits of expanding the tax base and reinvesting in public services at the local level. Such initiatives may include an employer payroll tax, high-occupancy lanes and highway tolls, land-value capture, parking space levies, municipal sales taxes, downtown congestion fees, corporate and income taxes, hotel levies, and an increase in development charges (AECOM-KPMG 2013; TRBOT 2013; Hjartarson, Hinton, and Szala 2011). The establishment of new taxation and administrative powers could be accomplished by provincial legislation and dedicated revenue streams. However, if municipalities are left to act on their own, without extra-market and extra-local planning capacities, intensified interlocal competition may result in a vicious circle of subsidies and

beggar-thy-neighbour tax policies. And conferring new powers on municipal councils still requires new urban planning orientations with other levels of government.

Since federal and provincial governments possess the major powers of taxation, they have a responsibility to ensure that the needs of municipalities can be met by appropriate fiscal capacities. But municipalities cannot resolve issues related to climate change, public transportation, housing, wastewater, and so forth at the local level alone. These challenges require developing new coordinated state planning capacities with, at a minimum, dedicated funding to launch a national transit strategy, a national clean water fund, community development strategies in self-governing Northern and Indigenous communities, and long-term municipal funding for social and physical infrastructure.

New organizational capacities will be needed to make such ideas politically viable. Such initiatives would need to emphasize the social value of extending public services and shift the debate from meeting individual consumer needs to creating livable cities with decent employment, public spaces, universal services, and ecologically sustainable development (Leitner, Peck, and Sheppard 2007; Merrifield 2010; Beaumont and Dart 2010; Harvey 2012). Making the case for an expanded public sector fundamentally opposes the prevailing orthodoxy of neoliberalism – one that challenges private capital accumulation as the engine of economic growth – and raises a set of demands for non-commodified labour and services. This means not only expanding the redistributive role of the state but actually taking the lead in challenging market rule. Reducing public spending (and thus public sector employment) increases unemployment, weakens consumption, and exacerbates income inequality. One of the few silver linings of the 2008 recession has been that governments can borrow money at historically low interest rates, making large scale public reinvestments more feasible than ever.

In the absence of organized civic political parties (they are effectively banned in Ontario by the Municipal Elections Act), trade union and community activists must fill that void. The anti-poverty movement has been the most vocal opponent of municipal service level and staff cuts. Moreover, in the face of continued gentrification (partly driven by the property tax that is tied to market value) and falling housing

affordability, many working poor continue to fall deeper into debt amidst increasing social insecurity.

The political coalitions that have been thrown up across Ontario municipalities to fight the cuts over the last two decades have not been effective enough to reverse these processes. A number of notable labour-community coalitions have sprung across Ontario municipalities, including campaigns for public services, housing, living wages, fights against privatization, and demands for “good jobs for all”. There are also important initiatives taking place around homelessness, poverty, anti-racist policing, Indigenous rights and environmental movements that have opened up new spaces that challenge neoliberal diktats. These movements, campaigns and coalitions now face new challenges in the Ford administration in Ontario, with its hard right policy platform. Activists will have to struggle with new forms of cooperation between movements, and forge shared interests and solidarity political capacities. An alternative politics, even radical urban praxis, may yet emerge to address the social divisions of an increasingly divided province.

NOTES

- 1 For example, an Ontario municipality may issue long-term debt only if used for capital purposes. It cannot borrow for operations, except by issuing promissory notes that require repayment when the current tax levy is received. Other levels of government are able to refinance their debt when it matures and engage in long-term deficit management with respect to fiscal capacity. For municipalities, the principal must be amortized over the term of the debenture or bond and repaid to investors or contributions made to a sinking fund that will provide for repayment when the debt matures.
- 2 An exception was the NDP with Rae’s “fair shares federalism” campaign, which protested the “cap on the CAP” amidst dwindling transfer funds to Ontario. However, this was far from a real critique of the *causes* of the declining revenue transfers (and the neoliberal policies that sustained them). Rather, it was a general complaint about its *consequences* – that is, declining transfers. The neoliberal paradigm remained unchallenged.
- 3 Only 5 per cent of the Canadian land surface is of dependable agricultural use and less than 1 per cent is Class One land. More than 52 per cent of Canada’s best farmland (Class One) is in Ontario, most of it in southern Ontario where population growth is highest. Ontario’s Class One through Three agricultural

land represents about 6.8 per cent of total land in the province and 16 per cent of Canada's total agricultural land. By 1996, more than 18 per cent of Ontario's Class One farmland was being used for urban purposes and effectively lost to agriculture (Government of Ontario 2009).

- 4 This may, on the one hand, prevent pro-growth interests from dominating local councils given the broader scrutiny and administrative protocols of the provincial government. On the other, it may simply shift the focus of business lobbying to the provincial level, and intensify the worst effects of sprawl. Some Greenbelt policies have to an extent succeeded in containing urban sprawl, preserving rural farmlands, and increasing density, while others have led to sharp increases in the value of urban lands, such as residential and commercial real estate, in addition to pushing development to areas outside of the Greenbelt where land is cheaper and building restrictions are often fewer (Ali 2008).
- 5 It is estimated that 82 per cent of municipal infrastructure across Canada is exhausted. For example, more than half of all municipal roads are displaying advanced deterioration, 40 per cent of pumping stations and storage tanks are in decline (with new federal water regulations expected to add some \$25 billion over 20 years), and more than 30 per cent of underground pipelines are in need of replacement. Canadian municipalities now face an infrastructure deficit in the range of \$125 billion, with combined provincial and federal infrastructural deficits more than double that amount (FCM 2012; AMO 2012).
- 6 The Residential and Civil Construction Alliance of Ontario (2010, 6–7) has argued:

Over the next 50 years there is the risk of public infrastructure underinvestment that could cost the Canadian economy 1.1 per cent of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth ... It will cost the average Canadian worker between \$9,000 and \$51,000, with the younger generation disproportionately at risk, and decrease the after-tax profitability of Canadian businesses by a long term average of 20 per cent ... Results show that for every extra dollar paid in taxation revenue, the taxpayer is better off by \$1.48 on average, in after-tax wage terms. That means mitigating the underinvestment risk is cost effective.

REFERENCES

- Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. 2005. *Urban Aboriginal Strategy Pilot Projects Formative Evaluation: Final Report*. Ottawa: Queen's Printer.
- AECOM-KPMG. 2013. *Big Move Implementation Economics: Revenue Tool Profiles*. Markham: AECOM.

- Albo, G. 1994. "Competitive Austerity and the Impasse of Capitalist Employment Policy." In *Socialist Register 1994*, edited by R. Miliband and L. Panitch. London: Merlin Press.
- Albo, G., D. Langille, and L. Panitch, eds. 1993. *A Different Kind of State? Popular Power and Democratic Administration*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Ali, A.K. 2008. "Greenbelts to Contain Urban Growth in Ontario, Canada: Promises and Prospects." *Planning, Practice and Research* 23 (4).
- Association of Municipalities of Ontario. 2012a. *Towards a New Federal Long-Term Infrastructure Plan: AMO's Submission to Infrastructure Canada*. Toronto: AMO.
- . 2012b. *Annual Expenditure Report (Part 1)*. Toronto: AMO.
- Azoulay, D. 2000. "The CCF and Post-Second World War Politics in Ontario." In *Ontario Since Confederation: A Reader*, edited by E.A. Montigny and L. Chambers. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Beaumont, M. and G. Dart, eds. 2010. *Restless Cities*. London: Verso.
- Boudreau, J.A. 2000. *The Megacity Saga*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Boudreau, J.A., R. Keil and D. Young. 2009. *Changing Toronto: Governing Urban Neoliberalism*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Bradford, N. 2007. "Placing Social Policy? Reflections on Canada's New Deal for Cities and Communities." *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* 16 (2).
- Braedley, S., and M. Luxton, eds. 2010. *Neoliberalism and Everyday Life*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Brenner, N., and N. Theodore, eds. 2002. *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Broadbent, E. 2008. *Urban Nation: Why We Need to Give Power Back to Cities to Make Canada Strong*. Toronto: HarperCollins.
- Burke, M., C. Mooers, and J. Shields, eds. 2000. *Restructuring and Resistance: Canadian Public Policy in an Age of Global Capitalism*. Halifax: Fernwood.
- Canada Mortgage Housing Corporation. 1999. *Alternative Methods of Financing Municipal Infrastructure*. Ottawa: CMHC.
- Carroll, W., and R.S. Ratner, eds. 2005. *Challenges and Perils: Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times*. Halifax: Fernwood.
- City of Toronto. 2017. *Budget Summary*. https://www.toronto.ca/ext/digital_comm/pdfs/finance/budget-summary-2017.pdf.
- Deloitte and Touche. 1997. *Critique of KPMG Report Fresh Start: An Estimate of Potential Savings and Costs from the Creation of a Single Tier Local Government for Toronto*. Toronto: Deloitte and Touche.
- Desfor, G., and R. Keil. 2004. *Nature and the City: Making Environmental Policy in Toronto and Los Angeles*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Donald, B. 2005. "The Politics of Local Economic Development in Canada's City-Regions: New Dependencies, New Deals, and a New Politics of Scale." *Space and Polity* 9 (3).
- Duffy, A., D. Glenday, and N. Pupo, eds. 1997. *Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, No Jobs: The Transformation of Work in the 21st Century*. Toronto: Harcourt.

- Evans, B., and G. Albo. 2010. "Permanent Austerity: The Politics of the Canadian Exit Strategy From Fiscal Stimulus." *Alternate Routes: A Journal of Critical Social Research* 22.
- Evans, B., and C. Fanelli. 2018. "Ontario in an Age of Austerity: Common Sense Reloaded." In *The Public Sector in an Age of Austerity: Perspectives from Canada's Provinces and Territories*, edited by B. Evans and C. Fanelli. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Fanelli, C. 2013. *Fragile Future: The Attack against Public Services and Public Sector Unions in an Era of Austerity*. PhD diss., Carleton University.
- Fanelli, C., and M.P. Thomas. 2011. "Neoliberalism Redux: Ontario Responds to the Great Recession." *Socialist Studies* 7 (1/2).
- Federation of Canadian Municipalities. 2003. *Alternative Funding Mechanisms: A Best Practice by the National Guide to Sustainable Municipal Infrastructure*. Toronto: FCM.
- . 2012. *The State of Canada's Cities and Communities*. Ottawa: FCM.
- Financial Accountability Office of Ontario. 2018. *Hydro One: Updated Financial Analysis of the Partial Sale of Hydro One*. Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario.
- Found, A. 2012. "Scale Economies in Fire and Police Services." *IMFG Paper N. 12*. Toronto: University of Toronto Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance.
- Government of Ontario, Association of Municipalities of Ontario, City of Toronto. 2008. *Provincial-Municipal Fiscal and Service Delivery Review*. Toronto: Queen's Printer.
- Government of Ontario Ministry of Finance. 1995a. *Fiscal and Economic Statement*. Toronto: Queen's Printer.
- . 1995b. *Fiscal Overview and Spending Cuts*. Toronto: Queen's Printer.
- . 1999. *Ontario Budget*. Toronto: Queen's Printer.
- . 2010. *Ontario's Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth*, http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/ontariobudgets/2010/bk_tax.html
- Government of Ontario Ministry of Infrastructure. 2012. *Places to Grow: Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe*. Toronto: Queen's Printer.
- Government of Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. 2009. *Sustainability: The Intersection of Land Use Planning and Food*. Toronto: Queen's Printer.
- Grewel, S. 2011. "Is It Bad for Cities to be in Debt? Not Necessarily." *Toronto Star*, 14 August.
- Harmes, A. 2006. "Neoliberalism and Multilevel Governance." *Review of International Political Economy* 13 (5).
- Harvey, D. 2009. *Social Justice and the City*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- . 2012. *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Hjartarson, J., K. Hinton, and M. Szala. 2011. *Putting Canada on Track: A Blueprint for a National Framework*. Toronto: Mowat Centre.
- Kozolanka, K. 2007. *The Power of Persuasion: The Politics of the New Right in Ontario*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

- KPMG. 1996. *Fresh Start: An Estimate of Potential Savings and Costs from the Creation of a Single Tier Local Government for Toronto*. Toronto: KPMG.
- Krawchenko, T., and C. Stoney. 2011. "Public Private Partnership and the Public Interest: A Case Study of Ottawa's Lansdowne Park Development." *Canadian Journal of Nonprofit and Social Economy Research* 2 (2).
- Kushner, J., and D. Siegal. 2003. "Effect of Municipal Amalgamations on Political Representation and Accessibility." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 36 (5).
- Laycock, D. 2002. *The New Right and Democracy in Canada: Understanding Reform and the Canadian Alliance*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Leitner, H., and E. Sheppard. 1998. "Economic Uncertainty, Interurban Competition and the Efficacy of Entrepreneurialism." In *The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime and Representation*, edited by T. Hall and P. Hubbard. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Leitner, H., J. Peck, and E.S. Sheppard, eds. *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Loxley, J. 2010. *Public Service, Private Profits: The Political Economy of Public-Private Partnerships in Canada*. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.
- MacDermid, R., and G. Albo. 2001. "Divided Province, Growing Protests: Ontario Moves Right." In *The Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and Territories*, edited by K. Brownsey and M. Howlett. Toronto: Broadview Press.
- Macdonald, S., and R. Keil. 2012. "The Ontario Greenbelt: Shifting the Scales of the Sustainability Fix?" *The Professional Geographer* 64 (1).
- McBride, S., and J. Shields. 1997. *Dismantling a Nation: The Transition to Corporate Rule in Canada*. 2nd ed. Halifax: Fernwood.
- Merrifeld, A. 2002. *Dialectical Urbanism: Social Struggles in the Capitalist City*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Metrolinx. 2008. *Costs of Road Congestion in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area: Impact and Cost Benefit Analysis of the Metrolinx Draft Regional Transportation Plan*. Toronto: Greater Toronto Transportation Authority.
- Moore, A.A. 2013. "Trading Density for Benefits: Section 37 Agreements in Toronto." *Institute of Municipal Finance and Governance* 2.
- Moussauoi, R. 2013a. "Dealing with Developers: Municipal Bonusing Spurs Debate." *CBC*, 25 April. <http://www.cbc.ca/news>.
- 2013b. "Battle Brewing Over Toronto's Development Charges." *CBC*, 9 May. <http://www.cbc.ca/news>.
- Mowat Centre-KPMG. 2009. *Tough Choices Ahead: The Future of the Public Sector*. Toronto: Mowat Centre.
- Panitch, L. 1977. "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State." In *The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power*, edited by L. Panitch. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Panitch, L., and D. Swartz. 2003. *From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms*. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Peck, J. 2010. *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Peck, J., N. Theodore, and N. Brenner. 2013. "Neoliberal Urbanism Redux?" *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 37 (3).
- Pond, D. 2009. "Ontario's Greenbelt: Growth Management, Farmland Protection, and Regime Change in Southern Ontario." *Canadian Public Policy* 35 (4).
- Pulkingham, J., and G. Ternowetsky, eds. 1997. *Remaking Canadian Social Policy: Social Security in the Late 1990s*. Halifax: Fernwood.
- Rebick, J. 2012. *Occupy This!* Toronto: Penguin.
- Reshef, Y., and S. Rastin. 2003. *Unions in the Time of Revolution: Government Restructuring in Alberta and Ontario*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Residential and Civil Construction Alliance of Ontario. 2010. *Public Infrastructure Underinvestment: The Risk to Canada's Economic Growth*. Toronto: RiskAnalytica.
- Rider, D. 2018. "Would Doug Ford Give City Mayors More Power?" *Toronto Star*, 3 June. <https://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/2018/06/03/would-doug-ford-give-city-mayors-more-power.html>.
- Sanberg, L.A., G.R. Wekerle, and L. Gilbert. 2013. *The Oak Ridges Moraine Battles: Development, Sprawl and Nature Conservation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Sancton, A. 1996. "Reducing Costs by Consolidating Municipalities: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Ontario." *Canadian Public Administration* 39 (3).
- 2000. *Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Sanger, T. 2011. *Garbage In, Garbage Out: The Real Costs of Solid Waste Collection*. Ottawa: CUPE.
- Shepherd, T. 2013. "Woodbine Live! Project Folds." *Etobicoke Guardian*, 6 February.
- Skaburskis, A., and R. Tomalty. 1997. "Land Value Taxation and Development Activity: The Reaction of Toronto and Ottawa Developers, Planners and Municipal Finance Officials." *Canadian Journal of Regional Science* 20 (3).
- Slack, E., and R.M. Bird. 2013. "Merging Municipalities: Is Bigger Better?" *IMFG Paper N. 14*. University of Toronto Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance.
- Spicer, Z. 2011. "The Rise and Fall of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs: A Reevaluation." *Canadian Political Science Review* 5 (2).
- Stapleton, J. 2008. *Ontario Alternative Budget: The Last Recession Spook*. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
- Stoney, C., and K.A.H. Graham. 2009. "Federal-Municipal Relations in Canada: The Changing Organizational Landscape." *Canadian Public Administration* 52 (3).
- Streeck, W., and K. Thelen, eds. 2005. *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sustainable Urban Development Association (SUDA). 2011. *Places to Grow: Still Unsustainable*. Mississauga: SUDA.

- Tapper, J. 2012. "Billions Needed to Save Canadian Roads, Water Systems, Report Says." *Toronto Star*, 11 September.
- Toronto. 2013. *2013 City Budget*. http://www.toronto.ca/budget2013/2013_budget_summary/operating_budget.htm.
- Toronto.com editors. 2008. "City Hall: Council Grants Woodbine Project Massive Tax-Break." *Toronto.com*, 17 July. <https://www.toronto.com/>.
- Toronto Region Board of Trade. 2013. *A Green Light to Moving the Toronto Region: Paying for Public Transportation Expansion*. Toronto: TRBOT.
- Vining, A.R., and A.E. Boardman. 2008. "Public-Private Partnerships in Canada: Theory and Evidence." *Canadian Public Administration* 51 (1).
- Walker, G. 1994. "Planning the Future of Rural Toronto: Structure Planning in the Greater Toronto Area." *Great Lakes Geographer* 1 (2).
- Walkom, T. 1994. *Rae Days: The Rise and Fall of the NDP*. Toronto: Key Porter.
- Warren, RM. 2013. "Politicians Ignore Creative Ways to Fund Our Infrastructure." *Toronto Star*, 19 March.
- Whittington, L. 2011. "Tax Cuts Drive Harper's Right-Wing Agenda." *Toronto Star*, 19 January.
- Workman, T. 2009. *If You're in My Way I'm Walking: The Assault on Working People Since 1970*. Halifax: Fernwood.
- York Region. 2017. *Capital: Business Plan and Budget: Financial Sustainability*. www.york.ca.